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Nicaragua plays an essential role in the stability and security of the Central 
American sub region. The de-stabilizing influence of Sandinista policies in the 1980s 
gave way to the possibility of a cooperative security community in the 1990s. However, 
border disputes and increased arms and drug trafficking have recently threatened the 
trend toward increased stability and sub regional security. Sub regional confidence-
building measures adopted immediately following the election of Violeta Chamorro have 
collapsed in the last two years. This collapse of confidence-building measures has led to 
increased tensions between Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. The U.S 
should promote Nicaraguan participation in regional confidence-building measures in 
order to reduce these tensions. 
In addition, the relationship between the U.S. and Nicaragua is still strained from 
the policies of the Sandinista and Reagan administrations. Although relations have been 
normalized between the two countries, steps should be taken to expand the current 
passive relationship into a more active one. Confidence-building measures between the 
U.S. and Nicaragua will help to alleviate some of the strain between the two countries. 
This thesis recommends U.S. involvement and participation in re-establishing 
confidence-building measures in the sub region. A perceived gap in U.S.-Nicaraguan 
civilian engagement could be filled through the implementation of a comprehensive 
military engagement plan. The use of confidence-building measures in military 
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We cannot permanently adhere to the Monroe Doctrine unless we 
succeed in making it evident, in the first place, that we do not intend to 
treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at 
the expense of the republics to the south of us; second, that we do not 
intend to permit it to be used by any of these republics as a shield to 
protect that republic from the consequences of its own misdeeds against 
foreign nations; third, that in as much as by this doctrine we prevent other 
nations from interfering on this side of the water, we shall ourselves in 
good faith try to help those of our sister republics which need such help 
upward toward peace and order.1 
Theodore Roosevelt, Chautauqua, New York, 1905 
 
This problem has the peculiar difficulty of all problems in 
international relations. In such problems, with mutual confidence, 
everything can be accomplished; without mutual confidence, nothing. 
Therefore the common interest of all concerned depends upon establishing 
a condition of mutual understanding coupled with good-will and 
confidence. This is especially important where, as here, the differences 
between us and our Latin-American neighbors …so easily make for 
misunderstanding. 
Henry Stimson on U.S. – Nicaraguan relations, 1927.
xv 
                                                 
1 Emphasis added by author. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Nicaragua has been the cornerstone for security in Central America for the past 
twenty years. It is geographically situated to dominate coastal sea borne traffic on both 
the Pacific and Atlantic inshore waters. It also dominates North-South land traffic on the 
Central American isthmus and has common borders with three of the other six Central 
American nations. Nicaragua also dominated the political environment of Central 
America during the 1980s. Its promotion of revolution and Marxist ideology destabilized 
the Central American sub region during that period. Difficult terrain along its borders 
allows armed insurgents to cross borders at will. This permeability of its borders was 
instrumental in the success of the Sandinista revolution and enabled the survival of the 
Contras. This permeability is again becoming a problem due to the presence of drug and 
arms traffickers in Nicaragua. 
Recent border disputes with neighboring countries have threatened to erupt in 
open conflict. Regional confidence measures established following the end of the 
Sandinista regime in 1990 have collapsed. This collapse has led to increased tensions in 
the sub region, which have effectively stalled the development of a Central American 
Common Market (CACM). This has had and will continue to have a negative effect on 
the development of Nicaragua and the sub region unless these tensions are resolved in a 
manner acceptable to all nations involved confidence-building measures would provide 
an initial point for future resolution. The threats of armed groups, increased drug and 
arms trafficking, border disputes, and stalled development need to be reduced or 
eliminated in order to foster security and development in the sub region. Re-establishing 
confidence-building measures is critical to stabilize the region and to create a climate that 
will allow the reduction or elimination of these threats. 
While Nicaragua’s relationships with its neighboring countries have been 
problematic in the last twenty years, its relationship with the U.S. has been more so. The 
outright conflict in political ideologies between the U.S. and the Sandinista regime led to 
U.S. intervention just short of armed conflict. The Reagan administration’s proxy war 
against the Sandinistas through the Contra forces created an environment of deep 
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animosity toward the United States.  While relations have been improving since the 
Nicaraguan 1990 elections, more could be done to strengthen the relationship between 
the two countries and foster Nicaraguan economic and political ties with the U.S. The 
U.S. continues to remain involved in the Nicaraguan political process, most recently by 
opposing Daniel Ortega’s candidacy for president in the 2001 elections. Sandinista 
supporters see this involvement as meddling in the affairs of their country. With arms and 
drug trafficking through Central America on the rise, closer ties will facilitate mutual 
interdiction efforts in the future. One way to strengthen relations would be the 
establishment of confidence-building measures between the U.S. and Nicaragua.  
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
This thesis promotes the need for U.S. engagement with Nicaragua with a focus 
on engaging in and promoting Confidence-building measures (CBMs). Throughout the 
1980s Nicaragua was the cornerstone for regional stability and security (Wehr and Pfoser 
1990). Insurgent forces tended to radiate out of or into Nicaragua from the three adjacent 
states. In the process, weapons, insurgent training, and destabilizing ideologies were 
exported or imported. The Sandinistas were supplied from Costa Rica and Honduras in 
the late 1970s. Insurgent movements in Honduras and El Salvador were supplied from 
Nicaragua in the 1980s. The Contras were supplied from El Salvador and Honduras 
during the same period. This tendency for permeable borders makes Nicaragua a key 
actor for regional stability. 
Currently Nicaragua continues to be the cornerstone for regional stability and 
security. Although CBMs have enabled stability in the Central American sub region, 
recent maritime border skirmishes between Nicaragua and Honduras over the Gulf of 
Fonseca and Honduras’ recognition of a Colombian claim on the San Andres Islands 
have threatened that stability. The resultant military mobilizations in both countries point 
toward a need for further measures. Additional border disputes with Costa Rica combined 
with the Honduran skirmishes have threatened to cause a sub regional trade war. Arms 
trafficking from Nicaragua through Costa Rica and Panama to Colombia have added 
further instability to the sub region. Perceptions of a potential arms race and increased 
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military expenditures have compounded the problems and led to a flurry of conflict-
related statements and actions. These activities occurred during 1999 and 2000 and 
threaten the peace that was deepening throughout the 1990s. 
Nicaragua is experiencing problems in development, which also threatens 
regional security. Although Nicaragua has had success with its democratic transition 
since 1990, the current economic situation and perceived exclusion of certain interest 
groups are causing domestic security problems, including both common crime and 
political violence. Given the history of Central America and the geographical situation of 
Nicaragua, domestic struggles can transcend borders and cause instability in the region. 
Sub regional migration and drug and arms trafficking may increase if the Nicaraguan 
economy worsens.  
A review of current literature, periodicals, and policy focus reveals that Nicaragua 
is not a priority for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. has typically applied policies for 
engagement only when Nicaragua has caused open regional conflict. Examples of this are 
the occupation in the 1930s and the Sandinista revolution in 1979. The last efforts that the 
U.S. made for a truly comprehensive engagement plan were the 1990 elections and 
subsequent demobilization of the Nicaraguan Army and the Contras. Since 1995, the only 
significant policy move was the signing of an investment treaty in 2000 (Clinton 2000). 
Nicaragua and its neighbors are still experiencing negative effects of the U.S. regional 
policies from the 1980s. The U.S. could influence regional stability and improve its 
image by strengthening ties with Nicaragua. The U.S. could further its national security 
goals of reducing drug and arms trafficking through establishing improved relations with 
Nicaragua. 
B. THESIS ARGUMENT 
A comprehensive and continuous engagement plan is needed. Confidence-
building measures should be an integral part of that plan and possibly could lead to a sub 
regional cooperative security community in the future. The establishment of such a 
community would ensure peace in the region as well as enhancing the regional capability 
to deal with border disputes, natural disasters, armed criminal elements, and arms and 
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drug traffickers. In order to determine which confidence-building measures will be most 
successful in promoting interdependence and stability, an analysis of Nicaraguan security 
threats is necessary. If confidence–building measures that enhance the Nicaraguan 
security goals are chosen, they will be much more likely to be adopted and sustained. 
This analysis should take into account current Nicaraguan perceived threats as well as 
historical and developmental threats. This thesis will outline a framework for this 
analysis and derive recommended CBMs from that framework. Those recommended 
CBMs will then be compared to the current U.S. engagement plan for Nicaragua to 
determine whether existing engagement policies meet the need for CBMs. If gaps in 
CBMs are identified, new measures will be recommended. 
Comprehensive, threat-oriented confidence-building measures are needed not 
only between the countries in the region, but also between the United States and 
Nicaragua as through these measures, the lingering level of mistrust between the U.S. and 
Nicaragua can be overcome. In order to understand the need for these measures, some 
background of the relations between Nicaragua, the U.S., and the countries in the sub 
region is necessary. Since the U.S. and Nicaragua share similar goals in reducing 
trafficking and expanding economic integration, possible CBMs will be analyzed to 
determine the best possible measures to implement between the two countries. The 
strengths of military engagement lie in the capability to cooperate in reducing common 
threats and promoting trust between the U.S. and Nicaragua. 
The recommendations for engagement presented in this thesis are based on a 
thorough analysis of current published Nicaraguan and United States policies. The 
framework for analyzing possible confidence-building measures is based on the idea that 
CBMs should be tied to mutual perceived threats. CBMs that are functional in terms of 
accomplishing mutual national security goals have the dual advantage of building trust 
while working toward those goals. They are also more attractive to implement, as mutual 
gains will be obtained through their implementation. The key to understanding the need 
for these measures lies in an understanding of the past role that Nicaragua has played in 
the region, as well as what the future could hold if engagement is not deepened. 
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C. THE USE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
The U.S. promotes many types of military engagement through its theater 
Commander in Chiefs (CINCs), military attaches and Military Groups (MILGPs) within 
foreign countries. These military diplomats are used to engage the U.S. military and 
Department of State with foreign military and defense personnel. Military engagement 
takes many forms, but one of the more successful forms is that of promoting Confidence-
building measures. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are actions taken to lower 
tensions and reduce the likelihood for conflicts resulting from misunderstandings and 
mistakes made in foreign policy. They seek to make national defense activities 
transparent so that other countries are informed and aware of security policies and 
actions, and also seek to increase trust between countries. Examples of CBMs are: 
• Establishing direct communication links between the governments and military 
organizations of separate states. 
• Notifying neighboring states of pending military exercises, especially near 
sensitive border areas. 
• Exchanging defense budgeting and modernization information. 
• Exchanging personnel in training activities. 
• Increasing contacts through multilateral military activities such as peacekeeping, 
regional forums, conferences, and disaster relief efforts. 
• Establishing joint patrols for border areas or demilitarizing those areas (Child 
1996). 
CBMs were used extensively in Europe from 1919 to 1938, and between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union from 1945 until 1989. The use of CBMs in Latin America became 
widespread in the 1990s. The publishing of defense strategy “White Papers” in the 
Southern Cone countries in the 1990s has been part of their movement toward a 
pluralistic security community (Kacowicz 1998). More recently, multilateral agreements 
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for disaster preparedness have been established in Central America (SIECA 2000). These 
agreements have fostered exchanges of military personnel, training exercises, 
participation in regional forums, and converging operations models between states in the 
region. The amount and quality of CBMs in Central America continues to increase since 
the first real CBMs were employed to end the wars in the region during the 1980s. Those 
initial efforts culminated in the Esquipulas peace plan, effectively ending the Nicaraguan 
civil conflict and providing for a stable demobilization process in the region. 
In the latter half of the 1990s, the governments of the sub region appeared to be 
working toward a pluralistic security community.1 However it may appear on the surface, 
sub regional border skirmishes and resulting tensions have forced Nicaragua away from 
many of the CBMs established in the 1990s. Since the border skirmishes, Nicaragua has 
refused to conduct joint patrols with Honduras, stating that the borders are well defined 
so there is no need for patrols. In addition, Honduras and Nicaragua are being evasive 
about their military expenditures and exchanges of information. The breakdown of CBMs 
shows that more are needed, and that instead of a cooperative security community, what 
really developed was an amalgamation of states’ policies. In order for a true cooperative 
security community to develop, the states in the sub region need to be integrated rather 
than amalgamated.  
The distinction is important. Integration makes states interdependent with the 
mutual expectation of shared economic gain; a successful Central American Common 
Market would promote regional integration. Amalgamation is the formation of 
organizations, associations, and political institutions without true integration (Kacowicz 
1998). The creation of organizations such as the Secretariat of Central American 
Economic Integration (SIECA) has enabled cooperation between the countries in the sub 
region, but has not forced true interdependence and integration. Rather the countries are 
                                                 
1 A pluralistic security community is one comprised of member states that share 
common norms, values, and political institutions, and are deeply interdependent 
(Kacowicz 1998). The resurrection of the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
promoted interdependence, but the recent increase in tensions due to border disputes has 
prevented interdependence. 
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cooperating independently from a true regional community. In Central America we have 
seen the formation of organizations and associations, but the states are still not 
interdependent. Refocusing on CBMs is one way to increase that interdependence from a 
security perspective in order to set the stage for successful economic integration. 
Confidence-building measures such as joint patrols and exchange of information 
promote trust between neighboring countries. This trust is crucial to deepen political and 
economic relations between nations. In Central America, this trust is also crucial to 
creating joint, multilateral efforts in the reduction of common security threats such as 
drug and arms trafficking, armed insurgent and criminal groups, and natural disasters. It 
is likely that multilateral efforts will increase interdependence and inter-reliance. For 
example, if neighboring countries are dependent on each other for joint border security 
and that dependence is rewarded by decreased drug and arms trafficking, they will be 
more likely to use multilateral approaches to other problems such as the elimination of 
criminal groups, mitigation of natural disasters, or cooperation in economic development. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The method used for analysis is an interpretive case study of the relations between 
the U.S. and Nicaragua since 1979, the security goals of the U.S. and Nicaragua in the 
sub region, the use of confidence measures to establish improved relations, and recent 
U.S. engagement policies in the theatre. The analysis is qualitative rather than 
quantitative based on the difficulty of determining past outcomes of confidence-building 
measures during the turbulent periods of the 1980s and the post Sandinista transition. Past 
U.S. and Nicaraguan relations will be examined in order to establish the need for 
improved relations. The framework for analysis will use a systematic approach to relating 
threats to security goals, and then security goals to confidence-building measures. This 
framework focuses on the key common threats in the sub region as identified by the U.S. 
and Nicaragua. The security goals promoted by Nicaragua are then matched with 
confidence-building measures that will facilitate their achievement. Once the framework 
is used to establish linkage between the threats, security goals, and confidence-building 
7 
measures, U.S. engagement options will be examined to determine the best possible set of 
options that will facilitate the achievement of both U.S. and Nicaraguan security goals.  
A wide range of source material is available on the topic of U.S. and Nicaraguan 
relations due to the long history of U.S. involvement in that country. The 1970s and 
1980s generated voluminous amounts of scholarly work on the Sandinista revolution and 
the covert and overt U.S. actions to contain that revolution. English and Spanish language 
sources from both the U.S. and Nicaragua were used to include popular works, detailed 
policy analyses, and economic analyses. Sub regional and U.S. periodicals and 
newspapers were also used to provide a more detailed examination of specific actions 
between the U.S., Nicaragua, and the other countries in the sub region. While the 
literature covering the 1990s and the Nicaraguan transition to democracy is not as rich as 
that of the 1980s, many Spanish language sources exist covering security policies, 
confidence-building measures, and military engagement. These sources coupled with the 
large amount of published work on U.S. military engagement in the 1990s allows a 
deeper look at recent policies and events pertinent to the subject examined by this thesis. 
E. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter II reviews U.S. policies and relations toward Nicaragua since 1980 and 
establishes the need for deeper engagement between the U.S. and Nicaragua. Deeper 
engagement is necessary in order to overcome the problematic relationships of the past. 
This chapter also discusses the current U.S. policies and security goals in the sub region 
in order to outline what future U.S. policies should be promoted in order to achieve those 
goals. The concept that the same policies that will improve sub regional security as a 
whole will also allow the U.S. to achieve its security goals is presented. 
Chapter III shows the evolution of Nicaraguan security policies from 1980 to the 
present. The change from the outward looking Sandinista policies to the transition to the 
inward looking policies of the 1990s is reviewed. Current security threats are presented as 
identified by Nicaragua and Nicaraguan security goals are listed. This chapter establishes 
the need for integration between threats, security goals, and confidence-building 
measures and uses a framework to link these key points. Nicaragua’s past participation in 
8 
confidence-building measures is discussed in order to show the need for the re-
establishment of failed measures or implementation of new ones. 
Chapter IV outlines the possible options for U.S. engagement through bilateral 
and multilateral approaches. Bilateral options are presented as a means to improve 
relations between the U.S. and Nicaragua and overcome the negative relations of the 
1980s and deepen the improving relations of the 1990s. Multilateral options are discussed 
as a way to improve the security of the sub region and work toward a cooperative security 
regime.  These options are all framed in the context of the framework for linking threats, 
security goals, and confidence-building measures. 
Chapter V discusses the potential for U.S. engagement options to support the most 
broad-reaching confidence-building measures and makes recommendations for the 
implementation of the options discussed in chapter IV. The framework for linking the key 
points is tied to the list of options in order to outline which option will support a given 
key confidence-building measure. The need for improved relations between the U.S. and 
Nicaragua and the other countries of the sub region is revisited and the options for 
engagement are presented as a means to provide a window of opportunity in order to 
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II.   U.S. POLICIES TOWARD NICARAGUA: THE ROOTS OF A 
TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP 
Past relations between the U.S. and Nicaragua need to be examined in order to 
understand the difficulties of the current relationship between the two countries. Years of 
U.S. policies that were perceived by the Nicaraguan people as aggressive and invasive 
can yield insight on the need for confidence-building measures between the two 
countries. This chapter will analyze the decades of the 1980s and 1990s separately to 
examine what the recent U.S. role has been. The current relationship will be discussed in 
order to determine if current U.S. policies actually support the national security goals for 
the sub region.  
For forty-four years, from 1936 until 1979, the U.S. supported Somoza regime 
governed Nicaragua. U.S. policies ranged from the casual indifference of the 1940s and 
1950s to the support of a repressive regime in order to maintain the status quo during the 
1960s and 1970s. The U.S. trained and equipped National Guard would ultimately be 
used to severely repress a civil population that was completely alienated by the 
exclusionary politics and economic rapacity of the Somozas. Up until the overthrow of 
Somoza, Nicaragua had been the U.S.’s staunchest ally in the Central American sub 
region. With that strong past alliance in mind, the rise of the Sandinistas and their 
ultimate takeover can be seen as possibly the most disastrous blow to the U.S. influence 
in the sub region. This abrupt, revolutionary transition from a conservative, pro-U.S. 
dictatorship to a Marxist regime would polarize U.S. policy against the Sandinistas for 
the next ten years. The actions taken by the Sandinistas to provide aid to other 
revolutionary movements in the sub region would lead to U.S. aggression just short of 
outright war. This stance was taken in order to prevent the fall of neighboring U.S. 
supported regimes. While ultimately successful, this U.S. policy would destroy the 
Nicaraguan economy and leave the country with the highest per capita debt in Latin 
America.  
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A. U.S. POLICY 1980 TO 1988 
In 1979, the U.S. effectively cut off all military aid to the Somoza regime in 
Nicaragua, even to the point of influencing other countries such as Israel to stop aid. 
President Carter made this decision following human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan 
National Guard. While the Nicaraguan National Guard faced shortages, the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN) received a growing quantity of newer and more 
effective weapons from Cuba, Panama, and Costa Rica. The National Guard was no 
longer able to control the countryside and was having problems in the cities as well. 
Somoza resigned on July 17th 1979 and the National Guard collapsed on the 18th. The 
Sandinistas entered Managua on July 19th and proclaimed victory; they immediately set 
out to consolidate their hold on the government. Civil Defense Committees were 
organized throughout the country with a central headquarters in Managua. The new 
government strengthened ties with Cuba and Soviet Russia and coordinated aid for the 
Marxist revolutionaries in El Salvador and Honduras (Kagan, 1996).  The decision to 
support the revolutionaries in El Salvador and Honduras with Cuban and Soviet 
equipment was to polarize Washington’s reaction to the new Sandinista led government 
in Nicaragua. 
The Carter administration in the U.S. was faced with a significant challenge in 
Central America. The incoherent foreign policies of 1977 through 1979 had enabled the 
worst possible scenario from a U.S. perspective: the presence of a Cuban style Marxist 
state in Central America. Hoping to avoid the mistakes made in the early days of Castro’s 
Cuba, the U.S. initially advanced a conciliatory tone toward the Sandinistas. A 
confidential cable from Warren Christopher in August of 1979 directed the U.S. Embassy 
in Nicaragua to “explore and encourage Private sector participation in various 
Developmental projects …” (Digital National Security Archive 2001). Nicaraguan aid 
legislation for US$ 75 million was proposed to try to influence more moderate political 
leanings. The promise of aid from the U.S. enabled the Sandinistas to reschedule the 
foreign debt and acquire a two-year moratorium on debt payments. In October of 1980, 
US$ 118 million was given to Nicaragua. The receipt of aid prompted a reversal of policy 
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by the Sandinistas. The Sandinista leadership consigned any elections to the hazy future, 
stating the current government would remain until at least 1985. 
The Carter government sustained hopes for some moderation in the Sandinista 
party. The presence of Cuban and Soviet military aid in 1980 eroded that hope. The new 
Reagan administration immediately took a hard line against the Sandinistas after U.S. 
intelligence sources noted the presence of Soviet ships in Nicaragua carrying aid for the 
rebels in El Salvador. Assistant Secretary of State Enders went to Managua in August of 
1981 to talk to Daniel Ortega and other officials. If the Sandinistas would halt aid to 
Salvadoran rebels, the U.S. would commit to not using force to destabilize the Sandinista 
government. Enders explained clearly to the Sandinistas that there were  “only two things 
which could oblige us to involve ourselves militarily in the region:” continued aid to El 
Salvador and an arms buildup by Nicaragua (Kagan 1996).  
Almost immediately after the 1979 revolution, defeated National Guardsmen 
started building support for a counter-revolution. The small groups they formed in 
Honduras and Costa Rica would ultimately come to be called “Contras”. The presence of 
the Contras and increased U.S. commitment to turn the tide of communism in Central 
America forced the Sandinistas to re-examine their security strategy. Increasing dissent 
by moderate and right wing groups within the country, the presence of the Contras, and 
the possibility of U.S. intervention drove the FSLN to call for civil support of a large 
military.  The refusal by the Sandinistas to end aid to the Salvadoran rebels triggered the 
Reagan administration’s efforts to provide aid to the Contras.  
The Reagan administration and Republicans in the House and Senate promoted 
aid to the Contras; liberal Democrats who did not agree with the interventionist style of 
Reagan’s Central American policy opposed this policy. From 1982 until 1987, aid would 
be proposed for the Contras through various republican bills in the House and Senate. 
The Democrats would fight each bill with the moderates from both parties typically 
providing a swing vote for or against. The end result was an intermittent trickle of aid for 
the Contras, which left them in no position to prosecute a sustained, protracted war. 
During times of aid flow, they would conduct operations against the Sandinistas, as aid 
dried up, they would filter back across the borders to their safe havens in Honduras and 
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Costa Rica. This unreliable form of assistance would lead the Reagan administration to 
seek aid from outside the legislative process, ultimately with disastrous effect. 
The Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the conflict almost from the 
very beginning. From mining the harbors of Nicaragua to arranging money transfers from 
the Saudis, the CIA would provide the impetus for U.S. operations in and around the 
region. It was unreasonable to expect that the CIA’s mining, air transportation operations, 
and money transfers would go un-noticed by Congress and by 1983, House Democrats 
had formed a significant block of supporters to conduct an investigation and move to halt 
the administration’s involvement in Nicaragua (Kagan 1996). Stories of the U.S. 
intervention were also starting to make their way into the press and the American people 
were beginning to compare the efforts in Nicaragua to the initial U.S. efforts in Vietnam. 
The opposition by the Democrats and the lack of support by the American public would 
end official aid for the time being and force the administration to seek for external 
foreign aid through what would become the administrations most embarrassing mistake.  
On again, off again aid continued to trickle through the period from 1984 to 1986 
based on the popularity of Reagan and his re-election campaign efforts. In 1985 a 100 
million dollar aid package was presented and debated until mid 1986 with passage in 
June. The aid money had just begun to flow again when the presence of CIA involvement 
was discovered. A CIA cargo plane was shot down while delivering equipment to the 
Contras. The revelation of direct U.S. support to the Contras would ultimately cause the 
Iran-Contra scandal and almost resulted in the impeachment of President Reagan in 1987 
(Ryan, 1995). The resulting investigations completely revealed the extent of illegal aid 
flow and devastated the administration’s Central American policy. Nineteen eighty-seven 
brought a slow year for Contra operations as the U.S. sorted out exactly what had 
happened. The U.S. elections of 1988 were set in an atmosphere of a U.S. public that was 
tired of the “shady dealings” down South. This public opinion and the new caution over 
covert operations displayed both in Congress and the administration would force newly 
elected president Bush to adopt a more open policy toward Nicaragua.  
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B. U.S. POLICY 1989 TO 2001 
U.S. policies during and immediately following the Nicaraguan elections were a 
break from the direct confrontation of the Reagan administration. The Bush 
administration adopted policies that allowed the Sandinistas breathing room during the 
elections, and did not publicly rejoice in the outcome (Kagan, 1996 and Close, 1999). 
President Bush and Secretary Baker both needed to achieve a landmark victory in the 
new U.S. foreign policy of compromise. Baker worked through the Soviet Union to send 
a message to the Sandinistas that the U.S. would normalize relations with Nicaragua 
regardless of the victor. Financial assistance from the U.S. was given to the opposition 
UNO party but was released so late that it had little effect on the actual campaign and 
election.2 The Bush administration was not forecasting a UNO victory, and sent several 
open messages to the Sandinistas prior to the election concerning an increase in embassy 
staffs for both countries. The UNO victory validated Bush’s approach as much as it 
repudiated the popular support for the Sandinistas. True to its word, immediately 
following the election the U.S. pressured the Contras to demobilize and assisted the new 
Nicaraguan government to achieve legitimacy with the populace.  
By 1993, however, the Bush administration shifted its policy from one of 
unconditional support for the Chamorro administration to one focusing on restitution for 
properties owned by U.S. citizens and businesses that had been nationalized by the 
Sandinistas. This would remain as the only constant focus from the U.S. toward 
Nicaragua in the 1990s. Similar to the Cuban restitution case, this policy has aggravated 
relations strained beyond the breaking point during the 1980s. The properties involved 
were mainly large land holdings that were broken up and distributed by the Sandinistas. It 
is interesting to note that land re-distribution is one of the key neoliberal reforms 
advocated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. To date, this issue has 
not been as large a priority as it is in the case of Cuba; this has so far prevented the fallout 
                                                 
2  A $9 million U.S. aid package was approved by the U.S. congress in October of 
1989, however; approximately $5 million did not reach the UNO party until January 
(Kagan 1996). 
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that would occur if a major emphasis were placed on restitution.  This issue has the 
potential to severely damage an improving U.S.-Nicaraguan relationship. 
Relations improved somewhat as the Clinton administration focused on 
developing trade and financial engagement between the U.S. and Nicaragua in the late 
1990s. The decreasing amount of U.S. influence in the sub region due to military and 
developmental aid reduction has been replaced by the U.S. influence on international 
financial organizations and the “Washington Consensus” (Fishlow and Jones 1999). 
Throughout the late 1990s, the U.S. fostered an open trade climate to the benefit of 
agricultural producers in Nicaragua. In 1999, in an effort to help Nicaragua recover from 
Hurricane Mitch, the Clinton administration signed an investment treaty giving 
Nicaragua status equal to NAFTA terms in financial activities such as loans, ability for 
transnational investments, and equal depositor status. (Clinton 2000). More recently, the 
U.S. has called for debt relief for Nicaragua and worked to mobilize international support 
for relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program through the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund. Attempts were made for a free trade agreement 
as well, however the failure of the Clinton administration in getting fast track authority 
from congress for the FTAA prevented any far-reaching trade legislation. 
Apart from the initial engagement of the Bush administration to resolve the U.S.-
Sandinista conflict of the 1980s and the trade policies of President Clinton, however, 
little diplomatic focus was placed on Nicaragua in the 1990s. When attention was given, 
it was often negative.3 A review of congressional testimony reveals that the focus of the 
U.S. embassy appears to be in tracking and verifying property claims. While diplomatic 
or intergovernmental engagement has been almost nonexistent, military engagement has 
                                                 
3 In February of 1993, a hearing was held by the U.S. Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, entitled: Democracy and Reconciliation in Nicaragua: A Critical 
Assessment. This hearing was critical indeed. Dominated by “The Helms Report” a 
collection of biased statements about property restitution, human rights abuses toward ex-
contras, and the mismanagement of aid funds, the hearing did not result in any 
comprehensive policy toward Nicaragua (103RD Congress February 1993). A second 
hearing was held in October of the same year and also did not appear to yield any 
significant policy direction. A hearing in 1996 did address the upcoming elections. 
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been the predominant form of U.S.-Nicaraguan engagement since mid 1998 following 
Hurricane Mitch. 
The SOUTHCOM CINCs (Commanders in Chief) have made considerable efforts 
to engage Nicaragua. Aid in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 increased the 
tempo of relations in the realm of U.S. military engagement. General Wilhelm 
successfully lobbied congress to allow for military to military contact between the U.S. 
and Nicaragua, and was the first CINC to visit Nicaragua since 1978 (Washington Post 
2000). General Wilhelm began his engagement with hurricane relief and expanded it to 
include deeper military involvement such as the exchange of personnel and invitations for 
Nicaraguan military personnel to attend conferences and seminars on military 
development and training, although few invitations were accepted.4 An anti-drug 
trafficking agreement was signed in August of 2000, allowing for joint maritime patrols 
by the U.S. and Nicaragua and U.S. aid to Nicaragua for counter drug operations. 
C.  CURRENT U.S. POLICIES 
The new Bush administration’s initial concern was to prevent the election of the 
Sandinista Party in 2001. In May of 2001, Lino Gutierrez, the former ambassador to 
Nicaragua traveled to Nicaragua to try to generate support from the liberal and 
conservative parties in forming a coalition against the Sandinistas: “The basic message 
from Washington is simple and correct: The Sandinistas haven't changed. If they return to 
power, they will doubtless throw the country back into the Marxist madness Nicaraguans 
suffered under two decades ago” (Schwartz 2001).  
General Wilhelm’s successor as Commander in Chief of Southern Command 
(CINCSO) was also very involved in engagement with Central America. In an April 2001 
briefing to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on the operations and threats in 
the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) General Peter Pace (CINCSO at that time) 
stated: ”The greatest threats to democracy, regional stability, and prosperity in Latin 
                                                 
4 Personal conversations between the author, USARSO personnel, and NGB-IA 
personnel, April 2001. 
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America and the Caribbean are illegal migration, arms trafficking, crime and corruption, 
and illegal drug trafficking. Collectively, these transnational threats destabilize fragile 
democracies by corrupting public institutions, promoting criminal activity, undermining 
legitimate economies, and disrupting social order” (Federal News Service 2001).  While 
outlining the threats, no plan for engagement was promoted in order to reduce these 
threats. In order to prevent any accidental clashes during the border disputes in 1999 and 
2000, SOUTHCOM provided Global Positioning System receivers and night vision 
devices to the Honduran and Nicaraguan patrol boats in the Gulf of Fonseca.  
Additional focus in the region has been provided in the form of large-scale 
engineering exercises to assist in the recovery from Hurricane Mitch. These exercises in 
1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 provided military support to civil authorities to rebuild the 
infrastructure damaged by Hurricane Mitch. The last exercise in Nicaragua resulted in the 
construction of six rural medical clinics, four rural schools, and four wells for potable 
water in rural areas. The gradual increase in military engagement points to a deepening in 
the relationship between Nicaragua and the U.S. This deepening could be sustained and 
fostered through further military engagement and confidence-building measures. 
D. SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICIES 
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua over the last 70 years has been extremely turbulent; 
the interventionist decades of the 1930s and 1980s have been interspersed with periods of 
complete uninvolvement or support of repressive regimes. The perceived sell out of the 
Nicaraguan National Guard by the Carter administration in 1979 has left the leaders from 
that time with an attitude of apprehension toward U.S. policies and involvement in 
Nicaragua and the sub region. Similarly, Sandinista military and political leaders who can 
look back on the 1980s as a time of U.S. intervention just short of war are also 
apprehensive about U.S. involvement. Many of the Contra leaders feel that they were 
used as bargaining chips in the overall U.S. containment policy; their level of trust is also 
low (Garvin 1992). 
 Currently it appears that the only time the U.S. seems to seek involvement is 
during Nicaraguan political elections and then seemingly only to exclude the Sandinista 
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party. The 1990s and the new millennium have brought a U.S. policy that is relatively 
uninvolved except for the issue of property restitution. This issue is not exactly a positive 
policy focus designed to foster good relations. The apparent hold on any approval of the 
FTAA has limited the amount of economic policies that can be pursued, and economic 
policies that have been promoted have been tied to the 1996 elections with support for 
loan cancellation being tied to the election of a government favored by the U.S. (Prevost 
and Vanden 1999). The only arena where engagement between the U.S. and Nicaragua 
seems to be positive is the relationship between the U.S. and Nicaraguan military. Given 
this “opening” between the two countries since 1998, it makes sense to capitalize on the 
positive relationship, especially since the U.S. national security goals for the sub region 
match many of those of the Central American nations.   
The same threats that are present to the nations in the sub region also impact the 
national security of the U.S. It is in the United States’ best interest to foster collective 
security in the sub region in order to reduce the flow of illegal drugs to the U.S., increase 
stability by limiting arms flow inside and out of the sub region, maintain infrastructure 
during natural disasters, and encourage economic development to achieve a larger share 
in the sub regional market. Reducing or eliminating the most important threats in the sub 
region directly supports the national security goals of the U.S. The use of confidence-
building measures within the sub region and between the U.S. and Nicaragua will enable 
the nations in the sub region and the U.S. to work toward a stronger security community 
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III. NICARAGUAN SECURITY POLICY AND REGIONAL 
SECURITY 
Given the influence of the U.S. in the sub region, Nicaraguan security policies 
have either been in support of U.S. goals during the 1940s to 1970s or diametrically 
opposed during the 1980s. Only in the 1990s has Nicaragua developed more of a neutral 
stand with respect to U.S. foreign policy. This has allowed the Nicaraguan government, 
ministry of defense, and senior military staff to develop a more modern, mission based 
evaluation of the security threats in the sub region. This chapter will review past and 
current Nicaraguan security policies in order to determine what the current or potential 
threats are, and more importantly, to discuss what types of confidence-building measures 
will mitigate those threats most effectively.  
A. NICARAGUAN SECURITY POLICY 1980 TO 1990 
 In the 1980s, the Nicaraguan government was threatened by domestic insurgents 
and skirmishes along its borders with Honduras and El Salvador. The Sandinistas 
provided military aid to insurgents in both El Salvador and Honduras (Kagan 1996). The 
U.S. feared the spread of Soviet aligned governments in Central America and provided 
military aid to the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua in an attempt to overthrow the 
Sandinista Regime. The Contra forces never presented a serious threat to the Sandinistas, 
but as long as they existed the U.S. would have a “lever” to impose its policies on 
Nicaragua. In this respect, the Contras served the purpose of an “army in being”.5 The 
threat of U.S. intervention would remain as long as a force existed that could be 
influenced by support from Washington. The Sandinistas also feared invasion from U.S. 
forces (Kagan 1996). The lessons of the U.S. occupations in the 1930s were remembered 
in the name of Augusto Sandino, a Nicaraguan revolutionary who successfully fought a 
                                                 
5  The U.S. naval strategist Mahon proposed the concept of a “fleet in being.” As 
long as a military force exists it poses a threat, no matter how insignificant, it must still 
be taken into account and may be able to influence the outcome of a conflict.  
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guerrilla war against the U.S. Marine occupation forces. The Sandinistas were willing to 
take extreme measures to prevent an invasion by the U.S. 
The Sandinista government engaged in a military buildup from 1980 to 1988 that 
was unprecedented in the history of Central America (Spalding 1987). Figures 1 and 2 
show the increase in imports and personnel respectively. By 1988, eighty percent of total 
imports were military related. Military personnel strength reached 80,000 active 
personnel in 1987 without including reserve forces. This was a seventy percent increase 
in just under eight years. This massive buildup was in direct response to the covert and 
overt threats presented by the United States policy toward Nicaragua. As U.S. support 
increased in the mid 1980s, the Sandinistas were forced into escalating spending in order 
to counter that U.S. threat. The cost of this buildup was staggering.  




























Figure 1 Nicaraguan Arms Imports: 1979 to 1993.  
In 1988 alone, Nicaragua spent almost one billion U.S. dollars in current market 
prices (World Bank 2000). In addition to the economic stress caused by the buildup, the 
heavy recruiting efforts necessary to maintain such a large force induced social stress. 
Protests against the draft became widespread by 1988 and as time progressed, more and 
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more defections from the Nicaraguan military to the Contra forces became evident 
(Kagan 1996). The Sandinistas were expending both financial and political capital to 
maintain the fight against the Contras. The economic and political costs of countering the 
U.S. threat would ultimately force the Sandinistas out of power. It is easy to understand 
the negative viewpoint Nicaraguan military leaders would have toward the U.S., even 
after the transition to democracy in Nicaragua. 
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Figure 2 Total Numbers of Personnel in the Nicaraguan Military: 1979 to 1993. 
As the conflicts escalated in the mid 1980s, and U.S. involvement deepened, 
several countries in the region established a group to try to find a peaceful resolution. 
This group was made up of foreign ministers from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Panama and was named after Contadora Island, the site where the first meeting was held. 
The Contadora group worked until 1986 to find a solution that was amenable to 
Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, the Contras, and the U.S. The specific challenges 
were to end the fighting between the Contras and Sandinistas, halt Nicaraguan aid to El 
Salvadoran rebels, remove the Contras from Honduran territory, and demobilize warring 
factions in an environment of mistrust and animosity. Perhaps the largest challenge was 
doing this in the face of an entrenched U.S. policy toward Central America. In the end, 
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the hard line taken by the Sandinistas and especially the Reagan administration doomed 
this effort at peace.  
After the failure of the Contadora group’s effort, Oscar Arias, the President of 
Costa Rica, began negotiating with all sides. His timing was better than the Contadora’s. 
Arias was able to take advantage of the window of opportunity presented by the 
impending collapse of the Nicaraguan economy and President Bush’s desire to end the 
U.S. intervention in the sub region. By 1987 a U.S. scandal had all but eliminated Contra 
aid, and the Sandinistas were looking for a way out of the seemingly never-ending war. 
The efforts of Arias and the new Bush administration’s softer policy toward Nicaragua 
resulted in a peaceful agreement. In 1989 the first successful cease fire agreements were 
reached. The U.S. stipulated that the only requirement to eliminate aid to the Contras and 
normalize relations was freely held elections.  
While the Contras were a small physical threat to the Sandinistas, as long as they 
existed, the possibility of overthrow and unrest existed as well. In order to get rid of the 
Contras, the U.S. had to be placated. To this end, the Sandinistas agreed that elections 
would be held in 1990. Aid to the Contras from the U.S. and Sandinista aid to the rebels 
in El Salvador decreased to almost nothing, and the cease-fire agreements held (Kagan 
1996). Public opinion surveys predicted a victory of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections. 
The probability that they would win by popular vote increased the Sandinista efforts to 
promote fair elections. The Sandinista leadership was of the mind that if free and 
monitored elections were held, and the Sandinistas elected by popular vote, the U.S. 
would have to end support of the Contras and normalize relations (Kagan 1996). In order 
to ensure this, the Sandinistas invited international election observer teams from the OAS 
and the UN led by ex-president Jimmy Carter. 
By 9:00 p.m. on the day of the presidential election, the UN election observers 
reported that the vote at that point was in favor of the opposition UNO party and Violeta 
Chamorro. While the Sandinistas debated overturning the election results, they realized 
this would result in a worst-case scenario in terms of domestic and international reaction 
due to the emphasis that they themselves had placed on the monitoring of the electoral 
process. Refusal to recognize UNO’s victory would lead to renewed support for the 
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Contras by both the Bush administration and alienated political elites from the UNO. 
These were the very things that the Sandinistas were trying to eliminate by holding the 
election in the first place. There was also the example of Noriega’s attempt to rule 
without legitimacy and his ultimate ouster by the U.S. At 6:00 a.m. on February 26th, 
1990, the day after the election, the Sandinistas conceded the victory to the UNO.  
B. POST SANDINISTA SECURITY POLICY 1990 TO 2001 
Newly elected President Chamorro faced a broad set of challenges. While UNO 
had won the presidential election by a 10% margin, it was an uncohesive coalition of 14 
parties. The fact that the Sandinistas still held 42% of the National Assembly seats would 
create a difficult atmosphere for enacting change (Close 1999).  However, the presence of 
divisions within the new government may have been a benefit with respect to enacting 
change, as a large diversity in agendas would ensure better representation for all parties, 
including the disaffected and demoralized Contras.  
Nicaraguan security policy in the 1990s was focused inward on establishing 
civilian control of the military, demobilizing the Contras, and fostering domestic stability. 
Following the 1990 elections, the Chamorro government immediately set about to reform 
the many state institutions, including the military. Sandinista General Humberto Ortega 
refused to step down as commanding General of the Armed Forces and was confirmed in 
that position, but lost the title of minister of defense. General Ortega’s refusal to step 
down as commanding general resulted in a minor crisis in civil-military relations, but 
President Chamorro wisely deferred, and significant progress was made in the early 
1990s. The army was drawn down, mandatory conscription ended, and the military was 
given a strict mission of  “…ensuring the security of the national borders” (Library of 
Congress 1994). The Chamorro administration set out to cut the army from 74,000 
personnel prior to the election to 28,000 by the end of 1990. An ultimate figure of 14,500 
was reached in 1993. The forces remain at that level today although Nicaragua has 
threatened a buildup in the wake of the recent border disputes (BBC 1999).   
Constitutional reform in 1994 -- which led to revisions in every article of the 
constitution pertaining to the military -- significantly changed the civil-military 
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environment. The changes in article 93 illustrate the new outlook on civil-military 
relations (FBIS 1994): 
Old Text: Article 93. The Nicaraguan people have the right to arm 
themselves to defend their sovereignty, independence, and revolutionary 
conquests. The state has a duty to direct, organize, and arm the people to 
guarantee this right.  
New Text: Article 93. The Nicaraguan Army is a national institution 
that is professional, nonpartisan, apolitical, obedient, and not deliberative. 
Symbolic of this new vocation, the name of the army was changed from the 
Sandinista Popular Army (Ejército Popular de Sandinista) to the Nicaraguan Army 
(Ejército de Nicaragua, or EN). To consolidate the change, the army requested 
civil-military assistance from the U.S. in 1994, which resulted in a new military 
code that “conformed more closely to the canons of military professionalism” 
(Close 1999).6 
By the end of the Chamorro administration in 1996, many positive changes had 
been made in civil-military relations but the government had had less success in resolving 
problems stemming from the demobilization of the Contras and downsizing of the regular 
army.  At the end of the Sandinista regime and during the Chamorro government land 
was given to both the Contras and Popular Army soldiers as a pension for their service.  
However, this allotment of pensions favored the Sandinista soldiers over the Contras, and 
negative feelings over this exist today. Feelings of exclusion have led the ex-Contra 
soldiers to form a group known as the Recontras. Those Sandinista soldiers who did not 
                                                 
6 This request was made to the National Democratic Institute. The NDI delegation 
established a three-year program to support civil control of the military (Pichardo, 1999).  
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benefit from the Sandinista land allotments have formed a group known as the 
Recompas.7 Both these groups have been at the heart of civil unrest in rural areas since 
the early 1990s. These two groups have avoided fighting with each other; instead, they 
have chosen to commit criminal activities with political overtones. These activities 
include robbery, looting villages, and political kidnapping. Although an amnesty in 1993 
quieted some of their activities, small groups remain and continue to commit crimes in 
rural areas (PRS 2001). 
Arnoldo Alemán won the 1996 presidential elections and, once in office, 
continued many of the projects begun under the Chamorro administration. Alemán 
appointed the first civilian minister of defense in 1996, who focused on demobilizing the 
armed groups in the North (DOS 1998). Disarmament was completed in 1997 and focus 
was shifted to deepening civilian control of the military. The mission of the army 
remained to protect the national borders and prevent internal disorder caused by armed 
bands of Recontras and Recompas. Hurricane Mitch in 1998 gave the newly restructured 
army a high profile mission to execute. The army’s professionalism in carrying out orders 
from the civilian National Emergency Committee minimized much of the disruption 
caused by the hurricane. The Nicaraguan Army also coordinated with U.S. forces and 
conducted joint rescue and engineering operations. The minister of defense outlined five 
major missions for the Nicaraguan Army in 1999 (Chamorro 1999): 
1.  Protecting natural resources, particularly the forest reserves of Bosawás and 
Indio Maize, and fighting against piracy of marine resources in the Caribbean.   
2.  Reinforcing the fight of the National Police against transgressor bands in rural 
areas, mainly during the time of coffee harvesting.  
3.  Supporting the fight of the Police against drug trafficking. 
                                                 
7 This Sandinista land and property give away was known as the “Piñata” for the 
rapid means of giving away huge properties and government equipment to the elites of 
the Sandinista movement. This caused resentment in the lower ranks of the Sandinista 
Party and Army over the small amounts of compensation they received. It was looked at 
as a betrayal of the Revolution. 
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4.  Strengthening the mine-clearing units.   
5.  Facing natural disasters together with civil organizations. 
Significantly, territorial defense against neighboring states was not included. 
Pedro Chamorro, the minister of defense noted, “In the dawn of the new millennium, the 
possibilities of war are more and more remote, particularly in our hemisphere. Because of 
this armies can and must play a very important role in supporting democracy.” 8  Based 
on the missions outlined for the army and the above statement, it is evident that 
Nicaragua did not feel threatened by its neighbors and viewed war as a decreasing 
possibility in Central America. In 2000, this view was refuted by armed skirmishes 
between Nicaragua and Honduras over long standing border disputes. The skirmishes 
identified the fragile nature of peace in the region and point to a need to include border 
disputes as a concern for the future. 
C.  CURRENT SECURITY THREATS  
There are four key threats that desperately need to be addressed from a bilateral or 
multilateral perspective. They are the elimination of armed rural criminal and political 
groups, prevention of arms and drug trafficking, peaceful resolution of border disputes, 
and the overarching threat of failed economic expansion and sustainability. Other threats 
exist in the form of damage due to natural disasters (magnified by unsustainable 
agricultural practices), uncleared land mines that prevent agricultural development, and 
poaching of natural resources. All of these threats could be addressed if multilateral 
security cooperation is stressed through confidence-building measures. 
                                                 
8 Translated by the author from Diálogo Centro-americano San José, Costa Rica 
No. 38 Marzo-Abril 1999 Ejércitos para preservar la paz y la democracia. Pedro Joaquín 
Chamorro Ministro de Defensa de Nicaragua 
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Armed Criminal and Political Groups 
Armed criminal and semi-political groups in Nicaragua are the largest threat to 
internal security. These groups mainly conduct criminal activities such as robbery, 
extortion, and kidnapping. However, during times of high political tension such as 
campaigns and elections, these groups also commit political crimes (PRS 2001). 
Politically motivated bombings, murder, and violent protests have occurred throughout 
the late 1990s. The large amount of weapons and other military equipment in the region 
combined with rugged, inaccessible terrain prevents the elimination of these groups by 
tactical force. Neither the army nor the police have had significant success in eliminating 
the groups. 
Due to the permeable nature of the borders in the sub region, Nicaragua’s armed 
groups are also beginning to present an external threat to the sub region. Evidence is 
mounting that arms are being sent from Nicaragua through Costa Rica and Panama, to 
ultimately arrive in the hands of the FARC in Colombia (Simon and Hadden 2001).9 The 
bulk of the cocaine being trafficked to Central America is apparently being paid for by 
weapons left over from the wars of the 1980s (EFE News Service 2000). These arms are 
being shipped by a variety of land and sea routes. In an area of dense forests and difficult 
terrain, stopping this growing flow of arms will be a difficult task at best. In addition to 
arms, the FARC is evidently receiving assistance from military advisors from within 
Nicaragua. As the FARC purchases more and more technical weapons systems, expertise  
                                                 
9 Bishop Romulo Emiliani of Panama has directly opposed FARC personnel 
operating in southern Panama. He said that the escalation of violence in Colombia is 
causing Colombian criminals and combatants to turn to Central America for weapons and 
a safe haven.   "The big business now is the arms that come from Central America left 
over from the various wars in the area," he said. "The situation is very conflicted because 
the region has high unemployment, underdevelopment and a lot of people who were left 
with nothing after the wars. Given the present conditions in Central America, I think that 
in 10 years the zone will become a highly dangerous dictatorship of the underworld." 
(Gonzales 2000)  
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in their usage is needed. The Recontras and Recompas who are not integrated into 
Nicaraguan society appear to be filling the role of trainers to the FARC (Ambrus and 
Contreras 1999).  
Increased Drug Trafficking 
The increase of drug trafficking in the region makes the elimination of the armed 
groups even more critical. Figure 3 shows the increase in cocaine seizures in Nicaragua 
from 1992 to 1998. Combined with the evidence of arms trafficking for drugs, this points 
to an increase in drug trafficking and increased police focus on the issue. The two main 
routes used by traffickers are the Pacific coast and the Atlantic coast although land traffic 
is significant as well. Domestic drug use is also increasing, predominantly in the 
economically depressed Atlantic region (INCSR 1999). The fact that arms transfers and 
military advice to the FARC is occurring also points to the probability of increased drug 
trafficking from Colombia to Nicaragua. It has been reported that “an estimated 59% of 
the cocaine bound for the U.S. passes over the land or through the territorial waters of the 
tiny countries of Central America” (Los Angeles Times 2000).  If trafficking continues to 
increase and the armed groups emerge as trafficking cartels, the violent narcotics regime 
now present in Colombia may well replicate itself in Nicaragua, albeit on a smaller scale. 
If the traffickers become entrenched in rural civil society, the narcotics trafficking 
industry could also expand into production facilities for the processing of coca base into 
uncut cocaine. 
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Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998
Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State, Washington, DC, February 1999 
Figure 3 Nicaraguan Cocaine Seizures: 1992 to 1998. 
The presence of armed groups and narco-traffickers in Nicaragua presents a 
problem that must be addressed from a multilateral perspective. The permeable borders in 
the sub region dictate that Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Honduras, and El Salvador will have 
to work together to solve the two problems. U.S. involvement in police and military 
training could also be beneficial. The U.S. could also influence more cooperative 
multilateral police and judicial interaction within the sub region. 
Sub Regional Border Disputes 
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In addition to threats from rural armed groups and drug traffickers, the 
Nicaraguan state faces conflict with neighboring countries over lingering territorial 
disputes. On 29 November 1999, Honduras and Colombia signed a maritime border 
treaty in which Honduras rescinded all claims to a group of islands in the Caribbean, 
effectively acknowledging Colombian sovereignty over the islands. This angered 
Nicaragua, which also had claims to the islands and in response, Nicaragua immediately 
enacted trade reprisals by establishing a 35% tariff on all goods from Honduras. By 
December 2nd, the situation escalated and armed Honduran patrols on the Coco River 
were barring the access of Nicaragua’s indigenous Indian groups to the Honduran side of 
the river (EFE News Services 1999). Both countries deployed troops to border areas and 
would periodically withdraw them and then re-deploy them as tensions ebbed and rose. 
Honduran soldiers demonstrated along border areas by discharging weapons in Jalapa, 
and on December 15th, the Nicaraguan government announced that it was increasing its 
defense budget (The Associated Press 1999). Honduran boats were denied permission to 
fish in Nicaraguan waters, and the Nicaraguan Army went so far as to set up anti-aircraft 
batteries in Managua (BBC 1999). 
The tense situation deteriorated further when firefights erupted between Honduran 
and Nicaraguan patrol boats on February 20th and 25th of 2000. The OAS began 
mediation efforts between the two countries, but no true resolution has occurred 
(CP/RES. 757 (1216/99) 1999). Nicaragua has since filed a claim with the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) over the maritime boundary between Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Colombia. Honduras has filed a suit with the World Trade Organization over the 35% 
tariff on Honduran goods. Tensions flared throughout 2000, with agreements being 
negotiated and then broken.  
Nicaragua also has border disputes with Costa Rica and El Salvador. While the 
Salvadoran dispute over portions of the Gulf of Fonseca appears to be firmly in the hands 
of the ICJ, the Costa Rican border dispute has not been presented to the ICJ although the 
OAS is attempting to generate dialogue. The dispute with Costa Rica involves the use of 
the San Juan River by armed Costa Rican police. The River is in Nicaraguan territory and 
the Nicaragua has protested the presence of armed Costa Rican police on its waters.  
Although the Aleman administration resolved the dispute by allowing use of the river 
after notification by Costa Rica, the Sandinista opposition party used this perceived 
violation of sovereignty as a political tool in the 2001 elections. 
To date, all of the disputes are being resolved by peaceful means either through 
the International Court of Justice or the Organization of American States. In addition to 
this positive step, confidence-building measures are needed to prevent conflict between 
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the countries during the (often long) time period that the disputes are in adjudication.  In 
addition, a country’s acceptance of the edict of the International Court of Justice or the 
Organization of American States is not automatic.  Confidence-building measures that 
repair the relations damaged by recent disputes will increase the likelihood that countries 
accept the mediated resolutions to their differences.   
Natural Disasters, Failed Economic Expansion and Sustainability 
Natural disasters pose another significant threat to national security in Nicaragua. 
Nicaragua’s location on the isthmus of Central America and the lack of significant 
mountain ranges combine to form a region that is extremely susceptible to hurricane 
damage and other climatological factors. Powerful hurricanes are especially damaging 
due to their ability to cross the entire country and still retain enough power to cause 
significant damage. Hurricanes Joan and Mitch both retained enough force after landfall 
to cross the country. Earthquakes are also prevalent in Nicaragua with initial damage due 
to shock, and subsequent damage due to fires, landslides, and tsunamis. The following 
table summarizes the natural disasters that have occurred since 1988. 
Year Type of Hazard Deaths Economic Costs 
1988 Hurricane Joan 116 US$213,500,000.00 
1992 Tsunami 116 US$15,600,000.00 
1992 Drought .. UNKNOWN 
1993 Tropical Storm Gert 13 US$71,800,000.00 
1995 Heavy rains 32 US$1,550,000.00 
1996 Hurricane César 9 UNKNOWN 
1996 Eruption Maderas Volcano*** 50 US$1,800,000.00 
1998 Hurricane Mitch** 19,800 US$1,500,000,000.00 
Cost Estimates based on 1998 Mitch Data Using a ratio of US$1,154.00 per displaced person. The number of displaced 
persons is reflective of the damage to infrastructure for domiciles and places of employment. Data for displaced persons 
from UNFPA.  ** Also has affected Guatemala, Costa Rica, Belize y El Salvador; *** Ometepe Island (Landslides) 
Table adapted from: Martine, George and Guzman, Jose Miguel, UNFPA Country Support Team, Mexico Source: 
OPS/OMS (1994); CEPAL (1999); OPS-Nicaragua (http://salud.ops.org.ni/desastre/d-civil/cronolo.htm); NASA: 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ol/reports/mitch/mitch.html  
Table 1 Recent Natural Disasters 
33 
While bilateral and multilateral disaster relief efforts have helped Nicaragua deal 
with the immediate aftermath of natural disasters, the longer-term economic effects on 
the economy are significant. While the data in Table 1 reflects the immediate costs of 
damage, the costs to agriculture are more pervasive. The soil erosion caused by large 
rainfall due to hurricanes coupled with poor agricultural practices has caused agricultural 
productivity to decrease from 1 to 1.7 percent per year (Gibson 1996). Soil losses cannot 
be recovered, and remediation requires extensive fertilization, leading to other problems 
in surface waters. Damage to crops such as coffee requires re-growth to production 
maturity, preventing rapid recovery of the crop. Losses also are incurred due to poor 
sanitation caused by degraded water supplies, loss of forest products due to landslides, 
and losses to inshore fisheries. In sum, frequent natural disasters have had significant 
long-term negative effects on agriculture, the country’s main source of export income.  
Bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote economic development would help address 
these effects.  
Land mine hazards in Nicaragua have also contributed to a contraction in 
agriculture, although recent efforts in de-mining are reducing that threat. During the 
1980s, over 135,000 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were planted inside Nicaragua. 
The large number of landmines present has had an impact on agricultural development 
due to the threat of death or injury to farm workers. Mines planted in coffee plantations 
are especially damaging to the ability to create export dollars from this critical crop. As 
of June this year, an estimated 78,000 still remain although Nicaraguan Defense Minister 
Jose Adan Guerra stated that “Nicaragua will be a country free of mines by 2004” (EFE 
News Service 2001). The de-mining effort in Nicaragua is a multilateral one, with the 
OAS, the European Union, Spain, Denmark, Norway, the U.S., Canada, Sweden, and 
Great Britain all contributing financial assistance. Currently Nicaragua is scheduled to 
host the third meeting of the Ottawa Convention on De-mining in September of 2001. 
Finally, exploitation of Nicaragua’s fisheries and forest preserves also poses a 
threat to Nicaragua’s economic security. This economic threat is closely related to the 
border disputes with neighboring countries. The current borders in the Gulf of Fonseca 
are not clearly marked and this leads to confusion over legal fishing areas. Nicaragua 
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impounded many Honduran fishing boats following the armed skirmishes in the Gulf 
during March of 2000. The forest preserves within Nicaragua suffer from poaching and 
timber theft. The economic impact of this exploitation on eco-tourism is more significant 
than the direct monetary losses from poaching and theft. Bilateral and multilateral 
agreements would solve at least some of the problem of resource exploitation. 
The sum of these threats creates an environment that is ripe for instability, in large 
part by undermining the possibilities for economic development. As noted above, 
frequent natural disasters, land mine hazards, and natural resource exploitation all 
negatively affect economic growth.  In addition, border disputes have slowed progress 
toward a Central American integration process.  As long as Nicaragua is using trade 
sanctions against Honduras as a lever for border dispute resolution, the development of a 
Central American Common Market and the economic growth that should accompany it 
will be prevented.    
This is significant because the lack of economic development in Nicaragua poses 
a national security threat, particularly if unemployed peasants are seen as a pool of 
recruits for the armed rural groups protesting against the government or trafficking in 
drugs and arms.  Figure 4 shows that while GDP, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per 
capita increased by 33 percent from 1990 to 1998, growth was not sufficient to overcome 
unemployment and underemployment due to parallel rises in population. Recently growth 
has slowed and coffee prices have plummeted, leading to the loss of jobs in the 
agricultural sector and migration to urban areas. In addition to low rates of economic 
growth, the distribution of income is uneven in Nicaragua.  A quintile analysis using 
1993 data shows the lowest 40 percent of the population receiving 12.2 percent of the 
total income, while the highest 20 percent received 55.2 percent of the income (Figure 5). 
Although no quintile data is available after 1993, it is probable that the situation has not 
improved. 
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$1605.15
$2142.36Total increase from 1990 to 1998 is $537.21 for a 
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Series: GDP per capita, PPP (current  international $). World 
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Figure 4 GDP per Capita in Nicaragua: 1990 to 1998 
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Figure 5 Income Distribution for Nicaragua: 1993 
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As a result, urban labor unrest and rural instability in Nicaragua are increasing.  
The fixed wage regime and weakened unions have led to increases in real wages of less 
than 2% per year for the same period (PRS Group 2001).  Protests over low wage rates 
are becoming increasingly violent and labor organizations are becoming more militant in 
their actions, resulting in acts of industrial sabotage. In 1998, these actions took on a 
political aspect when saboteurs cut the telecommunications cables to government and 
Army buildings. This action followed the Army’s repression of labor riots with live 
gunfire.  If economic growth does not benefit workers in the country, there may be a 
trend toward increasing violence and alignment with the armed groups present in rural 
areas.10   
Failed economic development impacts all aspects of a country’s ability to achieve 
internal stability and external cooperation with sub regional or regional trading partners. 
Nicaragua has had many instances of civil unrest in the last ten years due to the slow 
recovery of the economy and the problems outlined in this section. External tensions exist 
due to the border disputes in the sub region. While confidence-building measures will not 
directly improve the economic conditions of Nicaragua, they will alleviate tensions 
between the trading nations of the Central American Common Market and allow for 
improved relations with the U.S., the largest economic power in the hemisphere. If 
economic development can be nurtured, it is likely that the standard of living will 
improve thus leading to a decrease in civil unrest currently tied to the poor economy. 
Both bilateral and multilateral approaches to improving relations will foster an 
atmosphere that will be more conducive to economic development than the current one. 
Nicaragua and the other countries in the sub region would be able to increase their 
capacity for development if a true common market existed; any form of cooperation will 
foster the positive relations that need to be established in order for that common market 
to exist. 
                                                 
10 In the short run, the government has attempted to forestall this possibility by 
providing subsidies for basic food items (World Bank 2000).  However, it is not clear 
how long the government will have the resources to continue subsidies in the absence of 
economic development. 
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D.  SOLUTIONS TO NICARAGUA’S SECURITY THREATS  
As the previous section showed, all of the security threats currently facing 
Nicaragua require bilateral or multilateral actions by the states in the sub-region, the U.S., 
and the economic development NGOs.  However, if these cooperative efforts are to be 
successful, open lines of communication and transparent security policies must be 
maintained in the sub region. If trust is generated between the governments and militaries 
involved, the likelihood of increased operational cooperation and integration will be 
greater.  A key to re-establishing the mutual trust necessary to resolve security threats is 
the use of Confidence Building Measures. 
Although trade agreements, increased governmental contacts, or even unilateral 
actions by Nicaragua would all serve to increase trust, these are all longer-term actions 
than military to military contact. In many cases these actions are more dependent on 
domestic politics than military to military contact would be. In other words, increased 
regional security and emergency preparedness are easy to promote to the public and are 
hard for opposition elites to argue against. Military to military contact will also be most 
effective in the short term due to the commonality between armed forces. The similarity 
among military cultures allows for a greater understanding of mission and goals, even 
though these missions and goals might be counter to what the other nation’s military 
goals or missions are. At least the military leaders involved understand where the other 
nation stands based on their own experience. 
 This is not to say that other options are not important or should not be pursued, 
rather military to military engagement through the use of confidence-building measures 
could be used as a window for further and deeper governmental, economic, and civil 
engagement. The fact that the military directly controls the means for violence within and 
external to a given country also impacts why confidence-building measures should be 
pursued. If neighboring nations are in a position of relative parity as are the Central 
American nations, the more knowledge a nation has about its neighbors capabilities the 
less likely they are to create a military situation that is irreversible. Information on 
exercises or activities allows the other nation to respond diplomatically both externally 
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and domestically to minimize negative impacts within and without. Based on the current 
problems in the sub region, confidence measures will address many of the issues that are 
impacting the basic security, territoriality, and future relations of the nations involved.   
In order to ensure that confidence-building measures will be effective for the near 
future, these measures should be tied to those security threats that are common to the 
countries in the sub region. This commonality should encourage support from all the 
countries, especially if the resulting economic benefits to cooperation are stressed. CBMs 
will be much more likely to succeed if the implementation of those measures directly 
benefits the countries involved. Any CBMs that are promoted should be tied to goals 
reflecting the security threats. These goals to reduce security threats are: 
 The elimination of armed groups 
 The elimination of arms and drug trafficking 
 Peaceful resolution of border disputes 
 Mitigation of the effects of natural disasters 
 Clearing of land mines from rural regions 
 Protection of natural resources and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 
 Cooperative Economic Development 
Armed groups are present in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and arms 
and drug trafficking are increasing in all of the Central American countries (Gonzales 
2000). Border disputes are present between Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and Honduras, Honduras and Guatemala, and Belize and Guatemala. Natural 
disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes affect almost all of the Central American 
countries. Land mines are present in Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
Guatemala following the wars of the 1980s and the Guatemalan Civil war of the 1990s. 
All the countries in the sub region are struggling to achieve development and increased 
economic growth; one of the areas critical to this development is the natural resources 
and economic exclusion zones that each country possesses. All of these problems are 
common in the sub region and they all can impact cooperative economic development.  
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CBMs build a level of trust that should benefit both security cooperation and 
economic cooperation.  In turn, both forms of cooperation contribute to an overall 
reduction in the level of threat in the region. CBMs that directly address any of the threats 
above are important in themselves and provide the foundation for a future cooperative 
security regime.  To the extent CBMs directly address economic development, or 
indirectly contribute to economic integration by building trust, they help resolve the root 
causes of some of the other security threats, especially the challenges posed by armed 
groups and drug traffickers. 
In order to identify those measures that are most critical and beneficial for both 
Nicaragua and the sub region, linkage must be shown between threats, goals, and 
measures. Earlier in this chapter current and future threats were identified and goals for 
reducing those threats were created. The confidence measures listed in chapter one can 
now be reviewed to determine a best fit between the goals, and measures needed to 
achieve those goals. While no confidence measure implemented would be a negative 
step, it is necessary to identify which are most likely to result in mutual cooperation. 
These “high payoff” measures can then be the focus of engagement and influence. This 
process of linking possible CBMs to the identified security policies and threats is shown 
in figure 6: 
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IDENTIFICATION OF NICARAGUAN SECURITY THREATS AND FOREIGN POLICY
ARMED GROUPS
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Figure 6 Analytical Framework for Recommending CBMs 
Nicaraguan Participation In CBMs: Lessons Learned 
Nicaragua and the other countries in the sub region have participated in 
confidence measures in the past. These past measures need to be examined in order to 
determine which measures have been successful or not, and why. Renewed emphasis 
should be placed on any measures that have collapsed, and gaps between past measures 
and those identified in this thesis can be filled. Previously established measures can be 
used as building blocks for reestablishment of failed measures or the initiation of new 
ones.  
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CBMs were included in the initial Contadora Group peace process in 1983 and 
although they were not used at the time, these first efforts in confidence building would 
be implemented in future peace agreements. Costa Rican president Oscar Arias 
developed a peace plan that was implemented in 1990 and it included the CBMs from the 
Contadora proposal. These CBMs focused on verification of Contra disarmament, 
installation of “hotlines” between regional leaders, joint patrolling, and numerous 
information exchanges. This initial proposal of CBMs in Central America would prove to 
be a new model for the entire hemisphere (Child 1996). 
CBMs continued in the form of military draw downs in El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua throughout the 1990s. Information exchanges continued and CBMs were 
made an integral part of peace sustainment in the sub region (Child 1996). In 1995, 
Nicaragua signed the Central American Democratic Security Treaty (DOS 1998). This 
treaty attempts to strengthen democracy and cooperation in the sub region. Specific 
confidence-building measures contained in the treaty include: 
 Establishment of direct communication between leaders and militaries 
 Notification of military maneuvers, movement or exercises 
 The exchange of observers for all military operations 
 Mutual reporting on the status of military organization and capabilities 
 Mutual exchange of defense expenditures 
The presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and the 
Vice Presidents of Nicaragua and Panama all signed the treaty. However, the treaty is not 
yet in effect due to a lack of ratification by the governments of the signatories. The fact 
that Nicaragua signed the treaty (developed by Honduras) indicates some acceptance of 
CBMs included in the treaty. One indication that the CBMs called for by this treaty were 
not institutionalized is the fact that during the border disputes between Nicaragua and 
Honduras and Nicaragua and Costa Rica, all of these measures were either underutilized 
or discarded in the face of conflict.  
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Nicaragua is also a signatory to both the Santiago and San Salvador Declarations 
on confidence and security building measures. However, out of the six Central American 
countries reporting on CBMs to the OAS, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Belize have never 
reported any measures taken. It appears that although the civil and military leaders 
support the concept of CBMs, they are either unwilling or incapable of implementing 
them. There is a gap between the rhetoric and diplomacy of sub regional conferences on 
collective security and the ability to institute and sustain the specified measures and attain 
the goals presented in such conferences. 
While the threats of armed groups, drug and arms trafficking, border disputes, and 
natural resource exploitation all point to a need for joint border patrols and general 
CBMs. The confidence-building measures put in place in the 1990s failed to promote 
acceptance of patrols, and general measures seem to be superficially implemented at best. 
The countries in the sub regions were not able to sustain these measures in the face of 
open border disputes and trade disagreements. The only joint patrols enacted were 
maritime patrols in the Gulf of Fonseca and these ended by 1999 when border tensions 
increased. Negotiations in early 2000 reestablished joint patrols, but these too failed when 
Honduran and Nicaraguan patrol boats exchanged fire. On 16 March of 2001, these 
earlier accords were re-ratified although Nicaragua is still reluctant to participate (Latin 
American Newsletters 2001). Some cooperation exists along the border with Costa Rica 
in order to coordinate Costa Rican patrols of the San Juan River but this is far short of 
conducting joint patrols. 
While cooperation and mutual support for disaster preparedness and response is 
not specifically a confidence building measure, it does promote cooperation between 
participating countries. In Central America, emergency management falls under the 
authority of the military and involves military cooperation. Nicaragua and the other 
nations in the sub region have established some measures for cooperation during times of 
natural disaster. There is also an agreement to maintain lines of communication and to 
ensure that the Pan-American Highway remains open for relief and trade shipments. The 
massive damage caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998 showed the need for preparing for 
and managing similar disasters in the future. Immediately following the hurricane, 
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Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador all cooperated to assist in humanitarian relief 
efforts. Assistance was given by the U.S. and continues to the present day. Cooperation in 
the sub region for emergency management measures is fairly strong. The only gap that I 
identified exists in the exchange of assessment information for preparedness.11  
Although strong regional and global cooperation exists in reducing the threat from 
land mines, this cooperation appears to be more external to the sub region than internal. 
No references to sub regional cooperation in land mine clearing were found, however, 
some coordination must be taking place between Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, 
as most of the mines emplaced during the 1980s were located along border zones. The 
Organization of the American States (OAS) is currently managing the demining efforts in 
the sub region through the Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines 
(AICMA), an outgrowth of an earlier de-mining program started in 1991 at the request of 
the Nicaraguan government (OAS UPD 2001). The demining efforts in the sub region are 
proceeding successfully and are forecast to be completed by 2005. 
A review of Nicaraguan willingness to implement CBMs reveals three apparent 
problems that are common to all the countries in the sub region. These countries are 
willing to discuss the implementation of CBMs and have even signed treaties agreeing to 
these measures, but the actual implementation falls short of the intent of the conferences. 
The Central American leaders lack either the will, domestic political support, or the 
knowledge to implement and more importantly to sustain confidence-building measures. 
The measures discussed for the most part are general confidence building measures that 
lack a specific program of implementation or support systems that would allocate 
resources to them. Specific measures tied to border disputes appear to be easily ignored 
when it is in the interests of a given country to do so. The countries in the sub region need 
to move beyond the rhetoric and shallow diplomacy of the conferences and move to the 
next step of implementation and planning for sustainment. One way to promote that is to 
                                                 
11 In April of 2001, the author attended a Multilateral Emergency Response 
Workshop involving all the Central American countries except Belize. The amount of 
cooperation was evident by the briefings each country presented and from personal 
conversations with the delegates.  
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ensure that CBMs that are selected have tangible benefits in facilitating the security goals 
of the countries involved. More specific CBMs that address real needs such as protection 
of Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZs), disaster relief, and counter narcotics should be 
implemented.    
Civilian will and Competency 
The lack of civilian competency in national security and military issues has also 
played a role in the lack of understanding and support for CBMs. In 1998 a conference on 
Cooperative Security in Central America was conducted to develop means for 
cooperative security in the sub region. Although some progress was made, “…the civil 
leaders have demonstrated a lack of will and capacity to try initiatives in these types of 
policies” (Isacson 1998). In order to address the issue of civilian competency as well as 
the tensions over border disputes, the Declaration of Managua was signed in February of 
1999 (FOCADES 1999). This declaration acknowledges a lack of knowledge by civilian 
leaders in the arena of defense and security. The goal of the declaration is: “To lay the 
foundations to assure the influences of civil society in the definition of clear, realistic, 
flexible and viable policies in the matter of defense and national security, as well as those 
that assure an effective subordination of the Armed Forces and/or police officers to the 
authority of the democratically elected legitimate civil power.”  This declaration further 
outlines internal confidence-building measures that the states in the region will enact in 
order to promote positive civil-military relations.12  
While beneficial, the declaration focuses more on civil-military relations than on 
confidence-building measures and cooperative security. The deterioration of relations in 
the region following the border disputes of late 1999 and early 2000 indicates that more 
emphasis needs to be placed on educating the policy makers and leaders of the countries 
as to the benefits of confidence building. Since the border disputes, a number of meetings 
have been held by an OAS mediator to try to resolve the tensions between the two 
countries. The OAS’ main solution was a call for confidence-building measures to 
                                                 
12  Belize did not sign this document. 
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include joint patrols and transparency in military plans and acquisitions (Latin American 
Newspapers, Ltd. 2001). 
The externally focused Nicaraguan security policy of 1980s has yielded to a more 
inward looking one that is tied to promoting development and eliminating crime and the 
potential for insurgency. The Nicaraguan security goals are compatible to the goals of the 
neighboring countries and those of the U.S. Nicaragua and the countries in the sub region 
have all shown willingness to utilize CBMs as a potential means to resolve disputes and 
sub regional threats. However, this process of focusing on CBMs seems to have faded or 
lost importance in the light of a greater emphasis on economic development and debt 
restructuring.  
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IV. U.S. ENGAGEMENT OPTIONS 
Given the past willingness by Nicaragua and the countries of the sub region to 
engage in CBMs and the commonality of security goals, the U.S. is in a good position to 
foster what could ultimately result in a cooperative security regime for Central America. 
Working toward or even achieving such a regime would be extremely beneficial to the 
U.S. in terms of reducing the flow of drugs and creating a more favorable environment 
for development and economic expansion. Greater military cooperation between the 
nations in the sub region would certainly result in a more effective counter drug effort. 
This would greatly alleviate the burden on the U.S. to conduct military counterdrug 
operations in a time of increased operational tempo for peacekeeping and anti-terrorism. 
Many of the obstacles to economic development in the sub region could be reduced by 
implementing CBMs since currently the major issue preventing a cohesive Central 
American Common Market appears to be one of mistrust and punitive economic actions 
due primarily to border disputes. Minimizing those disputes through cooperative security 
activities could provide the impetus to renew the common market. This would provide 
one more step toward an FTAA. 
All of these issues can be addressed and promoting CBMs can create a window of 
opportunity. The question remains then one of what type of CBMs should be used or 
promoted. This chapter will outline some options for military engagement using existing 
U.S. programs and will review possible options for influencing sub regional cooperation. 
Once again, it is not necessary to create new programs; those that are already established 
should be utilized in an effort to resurrect the failed CBMs promoted in the past. Any 
gaps identified can then be filled through the implementation of new programs. This 
group of engagement options could be a part of or form the basis for a comprehensive 
future U.S. military engagement plan with Nicaragua.  
 A U.S. policy for military engagement can be broken down into two types of 
engagement:  bilateral engagement between the United States and Nicaragua, and 
regional multilateral engagement with the influence of the United States. Bilateral 
engagement options are direct measures taken by the U.S. and Nicaragua to improve 
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confidence and relations between the two nations. These options are focused on the 
exchange of personnel and information, joint training events, exercises, and operations, 
and increased contacts between U.S. and Nicaraguan defense personnel. Regional 
multilateral options involve using U.S. influence to implement multilateral measures 
between the countries in the region. Regional multilateral options could include joint 
border patrols, multinational military exercises, seminars, and conferences, regional 
security treaties, and the exchange of personnel and information. It needs to be 
understood that the U.S. does not have to conduct or necessarily even be involved in 
these regional actions; rather, U.S. military diplomats should work to influence the 
countries in the region to conduct such activities.  
Positive U.S. engagement and promotion of CBMs could foster greater stability in 
the region and increase the likelihood of establishing a cooperative security community. 
Military engagement should not be limited to the programs listed below. However, these 
programs offer benefits that current treaties and levels of diplomatic engagement lack, 
such as direct contact and coordination between civilian ministry of defense personnel 
and general staffs, greater knowledge of the working capabilities of a given countries 
armed forces, and increased familiarity with the operational methods for each of the 
countries in the sub region.  For this reason, CBMs are the main military engagement 
options recommended in this thesis. 
A. BILATERAL OPTIONS 
Mutual trust must be established between the U.S. and Nicaragua in order to 
overcome the legacy of hostility of the 1980s. Given the Nicaraguan security threats and 
the need for CBMs to mitigate those threats, options for military engagement can be 
identified that will increase mutual trust and assist Nicaragua and the U.S. in obtaining 
their shared security goals. These bilateral measures would be valuable in promoting 
CBMs as a means for increased security as well as providing examples for the sub region. 
Bilateral measures between the U.S. and Nicaragua fall mainly within the category of 
general confidence-building measures such as training exchanges and therefore do not 
48 
address the specific threats identified earlier. However, some bilateral measures such as 
the conduct of counter drug exercises do address specific threats.  
Existing military engagement programs focus on the exchange of personnel and 
ideas, as well as provide opportunities to support civilian as well as military organizations 
in Nicaragua. They are all coordinated through SOUTHCOM, and U.S. Army South 
(USARSO) is the main vehicle for the CINCSO to implement these programs. USARSO 
administers a wide variety of military engagement options for the region. Three of these 
options fall under the umbrella of CBMs: 
• Bilateral Exercises  
• Small Unit Exchanges  
• State Partners Program  
U.S. sponsored exercises have been conducted on a regular basis in the sub 
region. These events are predominantly of a medical or engineering nature. Twenty-three 
medical and two large-scale engineering exercises were scheduled for fiscal year 2001 
(USARSO 2001). These joint exercises involve all branches of the U.S. military, active 
component and reserve, and equivalent host country units. The U.S. forces also work 
with the host country units assigned for collective security during the exercises. These 
exercises not only promote positive bilateral military relations, they also assist in rural 
development and humanitarian efforts. The humanitarian aspects also provide an example 
of positive civil-military relations as the units typically are improving the infrastructure 
of rural municipalities.  
The U.S. also conducts joint exercises for drug interdiction in the sub region. 
Recently, several exercises were conducted in the region: “Operation Conjuntos” in 
Panama in 1998,  “Tradewinds 2000,” and Central Skies in 2000 and 2001 are all 
operations in Central America aimed at working with host nation personnel in 
interdiction and eradication efforts.13 General Pace, the recent Commander in chief of 
SOUTHCOM, viewed Central America as being key to U.S. counter drug efforts (Federal 
                                                 
13 Nicaragua has not yet participated in any of the U.S. counter drug exercises. 
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News Service 2001). This is one area where increased engagement and bilateral 
participation in counter drug measures will directly assist Nicaragua in the goal of 
reducing drug trafficking. 
The U.S. conducted a large “New Horizons” engineering exercise in Nicaragua in 
2002. This exercise involved personnel and units from all branches of the U.S. military 
and is being commanded by an engineer unit from the Wisconsin Army National Guard. 
This particular exercise is focused on constructing medical clinics, schools, and 
municipal wells for rural municipal governments. A series of medical exercises are 
included in this engineer exercise.  
Small Unit Exchanges are a means of confidence building through training 
exchanges. In this program, U.S. Army and National Guard units are sent to foreign 
countries and the reciprocating nation sends their unit to the U.S.  These exchanges 
typically involve combat units rather than support units. The benefits of exchanging 
combat units lie in their ability to effect positive military to military relations in the 
context of professional military forces. The U.S. receives the benefit of training under 
different doctrine outside of the normal envelope, while the exchange country receives 
information on U.S. training methods and can “showcase” their military abilities. These 
exchanges build on the shared pride of military competency and can be quite successful 
in bridging political gaps between nations. To date, no exchanges of this type have been 
conducted with Nicaragua. 
The State Partners Program (SPP) is a program established by the U.S. National 
Guard’s International Affairs office to promote military interaction and exchanges of 
personnel between foreign countries and U.S. states or territories. Current partnerships in 
the region include Belize and Louisiana, Honduras and Puerto Rico, El Salvador and 
New Hampshire, and Panama and Missouri. Guatemala is apparently getting ready to 
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request such a partnership but Nicaragua has not yet requested one.14 Activities under the 
program involve cooperative professional military education, promotion of civilian 
control of the military, humanitarian construction, Non Commissioned Officer 
development, and emergency preparedness (Matos 2001). 
One advantage of using the National Guard as a military engagement force is its 
dual role in national security. National Guard units have a traditional war-fighting role in 
support of U.S. active duty forces, but they also have the additional role of military 
support to civil authorities (MSCA). It is this second role that fits National Guard units 
perfectly in the promotion of improved relations between Nicaragua and the United 
States. During times of natural disaster or civil unrest, National Guard army and air units 
can act in support of the state governor in order to quickly restore order and basic 
infrastructure. This familiarity with MSCA allows National Guard personnel to assist in 
the various humanitarian missions promoted by CINCSO.  National Guard personnel in 
state emergency management offices are also extremely familiar with all aspects of 
natural disaster preparedness and response. The technical abilities that these personnel 
would be invaluable in assisting Nicaragua with the mitigation of risks associated with 
natural disasters. 
Another advantage of using National Guard soldiers in the role of military 
representatives is the close tie that National Guard soldiers have to their communities and 
a civilian environment. The MSCA activities that National Guard units perform in their 
home communities enable favorable civil-military relations and promote subordination of 
the military to civil authority. The National Guard also acts as a “window” to educational, 
business, and sister city relationships that extend beyond pure military engagement 
(Hutchinson 1999). In some cases, National Guard units have been used to support the 
operations of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Partners of the 
                                                 
14 The state of Wisconsin has been interested in a partnership with Nicaragua for 
several years. The basis of this interest comes from the 35-year partnership between the 
Wisconsin-Nicaragua Partners of the Americas, Inc. This non-governmental organization 
was an outgrowth of President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, established by the 
Charter of Punte del Este in 1961. There are also thirteen sister city relationships between 
Nicaraguan and Wisconsin cities (WNP, 1999). 
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Americas, Wisconsin-Nicaragua Partners, an NGO with 35 years of involvement in 
Nicaragua (WNP, 1999). 
B. SUB REGIONAL MULTILATERAL OPTIONS 
While there is a need to conduct bilateral engagement activities between the U.S. 
and Nicaragua, recent events in the sub region point to a need for multilateral measures as 
well. The U.S. is in a position of leadership to promote such measures for the 
improvement of security in the sub region. Possible options for sub regional engagement 
should be viewed from the role of a facilitator, not an executor. U.S. participation in sub 
regionally coordinated or hosted events would not be in conflict with that role. The 
promotion of these measures can be accomplished through both civilian and military 
diplomatic efforts. 
Out of the six threats that can be impacted by CBMs, joint border patrols between 
Nicaragua and its neighboring countries would assist in reducing three. If borders can be 
effectively secured, transnational security threats from armed groups and arms and drug 
traffickers would be reduced. Given the nature of the terrain in the sub region, it is 
unrealistic to think that any border could be completely secured, however, joint patrols of 
major crossing and transit sites would be beneficial. Aerial patrols would also assist in 
reducing the ability of armed groups and arms and drug traffickers to cross borders. 
Maritime patrols could reduce conflicts arising from illegal fishing in territorial waters 
and EEZs. Any of these efforts would be more effective if conducted under the auspices 
of multilateral or bilateral CBMs such as joint patrol agreements, cooperative police 
efforts and extradition, and comprehensive sub regional agreements to limit arms and 
drug trafficking. The U.S. would not be involved in patrols, but U.S. diplomats, both 
civilian and military, could work to promote them. Influence could be fostered both 
bilaterally and multilaterally through the U.S. representatives to the OAS and Inter-
American Defense Board. 
For Central America, one of the most influential vehicles for multilateral 
cooperation is emergency preparedness. This falls under the category of military 
engagement due to the common practice in the region of placing the civil defense 
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department under the army. All the countries in the sub region face the same set of 
natural disasters in the form of hurricanes and tropical storms. Most of them also face 
earthquakes, major landslides, and volcanoes. Major agreements have already been 
reached in this field through the common goal of maintaining the Pan American Highway 
following large disasters. Keeping this primary trade route open has stimulated 
multilateral responses in engineering and mitigation. Further opportunities for 
cooperation include exchanges to improve planning and risk assessment for future 
disasters. 
The U.S. is currently an agent for promoting CBMs through international 
conferences hosted by the U.S. government and subordinate military branches. These 
include seminars to promote professionalism in police and military forces, multilateral 
disaster preparedness seminars, and seminars on counter drug efforts.  Although 
Nicaragua has not participated in many of these U.S. sponsored activities, there are 
indications that this reluctance on the part of the Nicaraguan Army is fading.15  
Multilateral regional exercises offer another means for confidence building. 
Exercises can be in the form of large-scale disaster response or multilateral drug 
interdiction exercises. Nicaragua was conspicuously absent from the last multilateral 
counter drug exercise in the region.16 The key issue in promoting exercises of this type is 
the inclusion of all the countries in the region. Involvement of all forms of military forces 
as well as national police forces would integrate sub regional cooperation at a lower level 
than that of agreements such as the CACM, leading to a greater acceptance of sub 
regional community responsibilities. These efforts would probably have the greatest 
effect on the creation of a sub regional security community. The problem in conducting 
                                                 
15 The author attended a multilateral emergency preparedness workshop in April 
of 2001. During that workshop it was noted by National Guard Bureau International 
Affairs personnel and SOUTHCOM personnel that this was the first time they had been 
able to engage the Nicaraguans in any of the regional or sub regional, U.S. sponsored 
seminars. 
16 Los Angeles Times, 2000. “A source close to the government in Managua says 
Nicaragua's armed forces have resisted U.S. overtures because of continuing resentment 
of American support for the counterrevolutionaries in the 1980s.” 
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large-scale exercises of this type is the lack of experience and funding in the region. This 
is an area in which the U.S. could provide assistance through military engagement. 
U.S. military diplomats could also attempt to make some of the current bilateral 
exercise programs such as “New Horizons” more multilateral. For now, it is enough to 
work on improving relations between the U.S. and Nicaragua; however, attempts should 
be made to include sub regional military personnel in future exercises. For example, this 
would involve inviting Nicaraguan army engineer units to assist in exercises in other 
Central American countries, and inviting other countries to participate in Nicaraguan 
based exercises. This form of military engagement could lead to a greater acceptance of 
multilateral operations in the sub region. 
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V.   THE FUTURE OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT 
After reviewing the list of potential engagement options it is necessary to revisit 
those CBMs that are most likely to enhance regional security and therefore be more likely 
to be implemented. Therefore the engagement options that I have identified need to be 
framed against the context of the needed confidence-building measures identified 
previously in Figure 6. The priority for these measures is as follows: 
• Joint Patrols of Borders (and EEZs) due to the potential for conflict arising from 
border disputes. 
• Extradition and Police Cooperation Treaties and Counter drug Exercises due to 
the expansion of drug and arms trafficking and the associated violence. 
• Notification of Pending Training Activities in order to prevent border clashes. 
• General Sub Regional Confidence-building measures to increase trust. 
• Multilateral Disaster Preparedness and Response Agreements and Cooperation to 
better integrate differing countries’ military response plans. 
With the list of options and the priority of CBMs in mind, it is necessary to assess the 
effectiveness of these options in terms of accomplishing the goals related to the identified 
CBMs. The integration of threats, CBMs, and options is critical in order to set the stage 
for a comprehensive engagement plan that will be accepted by Nicaragua and the 
neighboring countries and will be effective over time in supporting U.S. security goals. 
A.  INTEGRATION OF OPTIONS AND CBMS 
Out of all the possible CBMs identified, the one with the largest impact on 
improving sub regional security would probably be the establishment of joint border 
patrols. Since border permeability has been a consistent problem for security in the past, 
resolution of this problem is a key issue. Joint patrols would also assist in reducing 
tensions over border disputes. Accidental border incursions by patrols would be less 
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likely, and even if they did occur, it would be with the knowledge of both countries 
involved. Joint patrols would also necessitate training exchanges, communications links, 
and frequent contact of leaders for planning. All of these necessary actions will work to 
foster relations between the military leadership of the countries involved. Confidence and 
trust would be gained as the forces of the countries involved became more familiar with 
the capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the neighboring states’ military 
forces.  
The threat from drug trafficking can best be countered by judicial and operational 
cooperation. While the topic of judicial cooperation is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
operational cooperation is well within the realm of confidence-building measures. Joint 
patrols will also help greatly to reduce this threat, but bilateral and multilateral counter 
drug exercises and cooperation are key to successful interdiction in the sub region. 
Counter drug exercises hosted by the U.S. or nations in the sub region will improve the 
interdiction capabilities of the nations involved and therefore are of significant value as 
CBMs to reduce the threat of drug trafficking. 
There are already successful mechanisms in place for multilateral assistance 
following disasters. These mechanisms should be expanded to include joint mitigation 
and planning efforts in the sub region. The value of expanding these mechanisms lies in 
fostering increased cooperation in the sub region and enabling better planning and 
response to natural disasters. The conduct of seminars, workshops, and conferences to 
exchange successful ideas and knowledge is extremely effective in promoting sound 
planning for and reaction to natural disasters. Further cooperation could also lead to a sub 
regional response agreement similar to agreements currently in place between states in 
the U.S. If a specific disaster affects few nations in the region, the other nations can assist 
in response efforts much sooner if agreements of this type are in place and detailed 
coordination has already occurred. This improved response will reduce the level of 
damage sustained and facilitate a quicker recovery from natural disasters. These types of 
agreements also involve the exchange of capabilities in terms of equipment and personnel 
in order to quickly identify possible sources of help for specific disasters. This exchange 
of information is a valuable CBM in and of itself. 
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General confidence-building measures can address several of the prioritized 
threats indirectly. The exchange of information both bilaterally and multilaterally is key 
in building and sustaining trust in the region and sub region. The exchange of personnel 
promotes trust and familiarity with the military capabilities of the forces involved. Out of 
all the programs in this category, the most effective are probably the training exchanges. 
Individual and Small Unit Exchanges involve building confidence through equality, and 
so are most likely to have the greatest effect on mutual trust. Of slightly lesser value are 
the regional engineer and medical exercises in support of civil authorities.  They are of 
lesser value only in the context that they sustain images of dependency. The political 
environment should be watched closely to determine if any negative effects from a 
perception of dependency are present. 
The State Partners Program in and of itself does not initially appear to have a 
significant value as a confidence building measure. However, it is in its capability to 
administer a cohesive plan for CBMs that it becomes valuable. The option of establishing 
this program will provide consistency in future military engagement. While state National 
Guard assets could not influence CBMs such as joint patrols, operational interdiction, or 
mine clearing, they do have extensive experience in training exchanges, engineering 
projects in support of civil authorities, promotion of positive civil-military relations, and 
emergency management. Some states also have significant counter drug experience and 
almost all of them have limited experience in this area. This experience can be funneled 
through a State Partner Program to increase mutual trust between the foreign nation 
involved and the U.S. 
In order to more easily see the relationship between threats, confidence-building 
measures, and the options recommended, a matrix of options to CBMs to threats is 
provided in Table 2. 
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U.S. Civilian and Military 
Diplomacy to Establish Joint 
Border Patrols in the Sub 
Region 
Land and Maritime Joint 
Patrols 
Drug and Arms Traffickers 
Armed Groups 
Conflict Over Border Disputes 
Exploitation of Resources 
U.S. Civilian and Military 
Diplomacy to Establish 
Notification Procedures 
Notification of Training 
Exercises 
Conflict Over Border Disputes 
Continued U.S. Civilian and 
Military Diplomacy and Military 
Engagement to Involve 
Nicaragua in Sub Regional 
Exercises and Operations 
Extradition, Police 
Cooperation Treaties, and 
Counter drug Exercises 
Drug Traffickers 
Arms Traffickers 
U.S. Military Engagement to 
Establish Mutual Trust 
Between Nicaragua, the U.S., 
and Nations in the Sub Region 
General Confidence-building 
measures: Bilateral and 
Multilateral Exercises, Small 
Unit Exchanges, and State 
Partners Program. 
All Threats 
(General Measures will 








Continued U.S. Military 
Engagement to Foster 
Cooperation 
Multilateral Disaster 
Preparedness and Response 
Agreements and Cooperation 
Natural Disasters 
Table 2 Matrix of Options to CBMs to Threats 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analytical framework for recommending CBMs, possible options for 
engagement, and the integration of those options, several recommendations can be made. 
These specific recommendations fall into two categories: Civilian and Military 
Diplomacy, and Military Engagement.  Both categories of recommendations need to be 
implemented in the context of the sub region and a long term planning horizon. Rather 
than including the Central American countries in regional Latin American activities, 
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efforts should be focused at a sub region level. It is too easy to lose focus on the Central 
American countries in the presence of more developmentally mature countries or blocks 
of countries such as the MERCOSUR group in the Southern Cone. This sub regional 
approach needs to be implemented in a coherent sequence of engagement steps. Planning 
horizons should be established in order to avoid a disorganized approach in influencing 
change. Long-term engagement goals should be published and disseminated through both 
the U.S. Department of State and SOUTHCOM. A five-year planning horizon would 
enable consistency and might also prevent disjointed transitions due to changes in U.S. 
administrations. This joint approach would also ensure a cohesive, linked diplomatic and 
military engagement plan that would be fairly stable over a multi-year period. 
The promotion of sub regional cooperation is likely to strengthen the Central 
American Common Market, which in turn could lead to the creation of a cooperative 
security community in Central America.  It would appear that the formation of a common 
market in the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) has been a significant factor in the creation 
of a cooperative security community there (Kacowicz 1998).  Cooperative security 
communities exist when regional or sub regional countries share common cultures, 
values, and political systems and have established mutual responsiveness and trust in 
dealing with each other. One of the most important aspects of such a community is a 
mutual expectation of shared economic gains.  
The Mercosur countries established a set of rules governing behavior when the 
Mercosur treaty was initiated. One of these rules was an agreement that any country that 
discarded a democratic form of government would be expelled from the union. This type 
of enforcement of common political systems has prevented two coup attempts in 
Paraguay and forced sub regional, open dialogue in those times of political upheaval. A 
similar commitment to maintaining such a union in Central America would create the 
same environment for open dialogue and conflict resolution. This in turn would facilitate 
the achievement of such shared security goals as resolution in border disputes, mutual 
consideration for EEZs, and shared defense information.   
Civilian and military diplomacy includes promoting multilateral measures in 
border security, counter drug efforts, and land mine clearing. The promotion of these 
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types of CBMs should be made a consistent part of U.S. policy for Nicaragua and the sub 
region. Cooperative multilateral police and judicial interaction should also be stressed. 
Efforts to promote and even partially fund multilateral efforts and exercises would 
facilitate future sub regional stability. Future humanitarian exercises should include units 
from all of the nations in the sub region. The practice of conducting seminars and 
workshops on CBMs should also be continued, but these activities should be conducted 
on a sub regional basis. Since the U.S. currently has good relations with all the countries 
in the sub region, it is in a good position to provide a leadership role in the multilateral 
measures recommended. 
U.S. policy should also include the promotion of multilateral measures through 
regional organizations such as the Organization of the American States and the Inter-
American Defense Board. A comprehensive diplomatic plan should be developed to link 
efforts from U.S. civilian and military diplomats as well as U.S. representatives to 
regional organizations. Opportunities outside normal diplomatic events should be seized 
in an attempt to influence the acceptance of these types of measures. The influence of 
senior state department officials and the CINCSO should not be discounted in terms of 
effecting a change in the sub region toward multilateral agreements.  Although it might 
appear attractive to attempt to link the implementation of measures to developmental 
assistance and funds, this should be avoided, as the potential for negative reactions is too 
great, and the ability to measure success in implementation is too subjective.  
More specific measures should also be conducted between the U.S. and Nicaragua 
in the form of military engagement. The openness of the Nicaraguan military toward 
assistance in disaster preparedness should be used as a means for engagement as soon as 
possible. The exchange of emergency management personnel between the U.S. and 
Nicaragua would be a significant positive effort in this area. Nicaragua should also be 
invited to participate in a small unit exchange (SUE) with the U.S. army or Army 
National Guard. These small unit exchanges provide direct transfer of military knowledge 
and capabilities and are relatively inexpensive to conduct. The value of conducting 
exchanges on a level of equality is extremely high. Command group visits during SUEs 
can be used to reinforce the measures and activities promoted by both civilian and 
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military diplomats. Nicaragua was selected as one of the host countries for “New 
Horizons 02,” a large-scale U.S. engineering effort. The conduct of these exercises 
should be continued as the Nicaraguan people feel the benefits and the U.S. soldiers and 
units involved obtain better mobilization training than they would in the U.S. While scant 
resources would prevent the conduct of an exercise like “New Horizons” every year, 
smaller exercises could be conducted on a yearly basis in order to sustain contact between 
U.S. and Nicaraguan personnel.  
The last engagement option recommendation is to establish a State Partner 
Program between Nicaragua and a U.S. state. Efforts have been made toward this goal 
already with interest being expressed by the state of Wisconsin and a representative of the 
Nicaraguan Popular Army. This particular combination should be closely examined, as it 
is based not on simply the availability of a given SPP but rather on a thirty-five year 
relationship between Wisconsin and Nicaragua that has stood the test of time and extreme 
tensions just short of outright conflict.  Although this match makes the most sense from a 
historical perspective, regardless of the specific state selected, the engagement plan 
should include a significant presence from a future SPP partner state.  
The SPP could be used as an implementation tool for future humanitarian and 
emergency planning and response exercises. U.S. SPP personnel should also be 
encouraged to attend workshops and seminars with their partner country. The 
establishment of a habitual relationship such as an SPP would ensure consistency and 
continuity above and beyond a long term planning horizon. The SPP state could also be 
used as a source for Small Unit Exchanges on a regular basis. This would provide 
opportunities for the involvement of a diverse group of units and commands and would 
integrate combat support, service support, and combat arms units from the state and 
Nicaragua. This habitual relationship would have to be monitored by both embassy and 
military group personnel to ensure that engagement goals are being met and the 
relationship is fostering mutual confidence, not preventing it. 
Although U.S. military engagement appears to be deepening in Nicaragua and the 
sub region, concerns exist that this may tend to promote military solutions over those 
negotiated or proposed by civil leadership. Based on a past history of military coups and 
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political influence, this concern is a valid one. Critics of U.S. policies in the sub region 
say that the U.S. focuses too much emphasis on the role of the military in humanitarian, 
drug trafficking and immigration issues and that diplomatic, not military, engagement 
should be pursued. This is mentioned to establish the concept of comprehensive 
engagement led by the U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua. Subjugation of the military to civil 
control must be stressed in all operations conducted by U.S. military units in the sub 
region. Humanitarian engineering exercises should more closely involve the civilian 
authorities from the area in which the projects are being constructed. U.S. military 
personnel should make an extra effort to recognize civilian authorities as being in a 
position of importance. 
The needed confidence-building measures identified by this thesis will only have 
a chance at succeeding if the civilian leadership of Nicaragua understands the reasons 
they are needed and how they can work to foster mutual trust and cooperation. This 
current gap in civilian knowledge of military subjects and policies must also be 
addressed. It almost appears that the civilian leadership in Nicaragua has agreed to these 
measures in the past more due to pressure from the U.S. and the OAS than from a true 
understanding of why they are needed and what they would accomplish. This “parroting” 
of the concept of CBMs must be changed to a meaningful understanding of the reasons 
for implementing these measures. This can only be accomplished through a dedicated 
effort to educate these civilian leaders in defense and security policies. This could be 
effected by increasing the amount of invitations to civilian leaders from Nicaragua to 
U.S. sponsored military schools, workshops, and seminars. 
Civilian and military diplomacy and engagement also needs to be integrated with 
development efforts in Nicaragua. Humanitarian assistance in the form of engineer and 
medical exercises could be meshed with specific developmental programs sponsored by 
non-governmental organizations such as the World Bank or private voluntary 
organizations such as the Wisconsin-Nicaragua Partners of the Americas and the Sister 
City programs. SPP activities could also be meshed with developmental projects in terms 
of civilian exchanges through the SPP program. Agricultural and infrastructure experts 
from both the civilian and military sectors could focus their efforts in conjunction with 
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the efforts of non-governmental and private voluntary organizations. Military 
transportation assets could also be used to supplement these programs. 
Nicaragua is too important for stability in the sub region to be left out of U.S. 
foreign policy. Some form of comprehensive engagement needs to be developed and 
implemented. In the absence of sustained intergovernmental engagement, military 
engagement should be used to foster improved bilateral and multilateral relations 
between Nicaragua and the U.S., and between the countries of the sub region. Steps have 
already been taken which, if supported and expanded, could lead to a pluralistic security 
community. The rise of drug related activity, the continued unrest caused by armed 
groups in Nicaragua, and the recent border skirmishes are all threatening the current trend 
toward increased peaceful relations. Active, sustained engagement and the promotion of 
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